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The recently published DoD Acquisition Improvement
Program increases the emphasis placed on using Reliability
Improvement Warranties as a means to improve weapon system
reliability and maintainability. Several previous studies
have concentrated on BIW selection criteria, cost factors,
and reliability improvement incentives. The authors believe
that adequate attention has not been given to the fleet
level impact of utilizing R IWs. This study reviews past and
present contracts to assess these RIW impacts on the Naval
Aviation community from an operational and supply point of
view. The complexities of fleet level management of
warranted assets, the rislcs posed to the contracting
parties, the opinions of fleer maintenance managers, and the
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The need for improved aviation weapons system reli-
ability and maintainability is of significant concern within
the Department of Defense (DOD). Increasing cost and
complexity of weapon systems coupled with tougher interser-
vice competition for the defense dollar dictates a need to
explore alternative methods of ownership cost reduction.
Recently, the acquisition process has emphasized ownership
cost reduction by focusing on Operations and Support (0 & S)
as well as acquisition costs. One avenue receiving
increased attention is improved weapon system reliability.
Sparked by significant reliability problems, an inten-
sive improvement program commenced in the early 1970's.
Since that time the reliability and uaintainability question
has received considerably more attention. Operational reli-
ability is now a major concern of the Defense Systems
Acquisition Review Council, an essential factor in the
design concept, and most recently highly emphasized in the
DOD Acquisition Improvement Program, i.e., actions 9 and 16
of the proposed initiatives [Ref. 1 ].
The Reliability Improvement Warranty (RIW) concept is
one attempt to obtain equipment with increased reliability
and maintainability and to reduce the cost of maintaining
equipment. The recently published DOD Acquisition
Improvement Program increases the emphasis placed on using
RIWs as a means to improve the reliability and maintain-
ability of complex and expensive weapon systems [Ref. 2].
Despite this emphasis the acceptance of RIW has not been
universal and many elements doubt tha actual value and
success of the concept..

B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Reliability Improvement Warranties vers created as a
tool for lowering life cycle costs through reduced mainte-
nance. The RIW concept appears to be in consonance with the
Department of Defense's need to improve combat effectiveness
while reducing weapon system support costs. Each year the
acquisition, manning and maintenance of a modern defense
force has become increasingly complex and expensive. This
complexity of new weapons systems is surpassing budget
constraints and straining the ability of the military to
maintain the systems.
RIW contracts are recent, but not entirely new to the
military, and some contracts have drawn to a close. It is
imperative that past and current RIW contracts be comprehen-
sively evaluated for their cost and mission effectiveness to
determine whether systems merit future RIW contracts because
of proven, and net theoretical, success of the RIW concept.
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF PROBLEM
One of the principal concerns of the Chief of Naval
Operations is the poor state of fleet readiness. A major
contributor to this condition has been the relatively low
reliability of systems and components and the inherent,
difficulty in maintaining them at sea. These support defi-
ciencies can be overcome and avoided if recognized and
addressed by management in the early stages of the acquisi-
tion process. The acquisition strategy must provide for
reliability and maintainability engineering support as an
integral part of system design.
As recognized by the Naval Material Command [ Ref . 3],
reliability and maintainabi lty ( R S M) must be highly
placed in the minds of people at all levels cf weapon system
acquisition management. The pursuit of reliability and

maintainability must be a disciplined approach to the acqui-
sition process rather than a set of practices and
procedures.
In the past, the naval acquisition process has been
characterized by emphasis on product performance, schedule,
and initial procurement cost. In addition, production items
have often been plagued with problems related to low
reliability.
Due to the failure to meet reliability goals in the
acquisition of major systems and subsystems, a decreased
capability with increased maintenance costs has resulted.
To meet this reliability need associated with Navy
contracting, many inovations in motivating the contractor
have been pursued. One new contractual concept to improve
reliability and maintainability has resulted in a new type
of warranty contract—the aeliability Improvement Warranty.
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
Based upon the increasing emphasis on Reliability
Improvement Warranties as a means to reduce the cost of
complex Naval Aviation weapons systems, a need exists to
evaluate their potential for misapplication. Several
studies have been accomplished on tha RIW concept. Most
data available concentrates on selection criteria, cost
factors, and reliability improvement incentives. The
authors believe that not enough attention has been given -co
the user of a RIW end item or the BIW interaction with other
related military goals and objectives.
The objective of this research is to review past and
present contracts to assess the impact of SIW on the Naval
Aviation community from the operational support and supply
point of view. The impact of managing a warranted asset at
the fleet level, the risks posed to the contracting parties,

tha opinions of fleet maintenance managers, and the fiscal




The many controversies involving Reliability Improvement
Warranties were researched through aa extensive li-erature
review, and by personal and telephone interviews.
The detailed literature search began with a Defense
Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) review and a
Naval Postgraduate School Library bibliographical search.
The resulting lists led the authors to numerous background
and historical materials, but many of the references were
outdated. Numerous Rl'rf studies of the government's and
contractor's risks, costs, and reliability growth, had been
performed by &RINC Research Corporation. However, these
m
studies seldom addressed the Navy's strong concern over
dependency upon the contractor, program administrative
costs, cost and impact of transition to organic maintenance
at contract expiration, and configuration control.
Mr. Oscar Markowitz, head of the Naval Aviation Supply
Office's Technical Section until 1979, authored most of the
Navy's literature on RIWs. His^prolific writings were a
valuable source cf background and history regarding the
Navy's HIS efforts.
To identify all the elements impacting on a RIWs effec-
tiveness and fill in the gaps in the available literature,
the authors chose a bottom-up approach. Interviews were
conducted at organizational and intermediate maintenance and
supply support levels. Depot level managers provided
insight and evaluation from both the organic and commercial
sectors. Fleet level maintenance and logistics managers
were gueried about their experiences with RIW contracted
eguipment. These interviews provided valuable information
about the RIWs impact on the operating forces.
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The authors also interviewed many persons involved with
RIW contract policy, evaluation, and administration. Sites
visited included the Naval Aviation Supply Office
(ASO) —Philadelphia, the Naval Aviation Logistics Center
(NALC)—Patuxent River, and the Naval Material Command
(NAVMAT) and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) --Washington,
D...C. These interviews added a top-down view of RIWs from
persons variously responsible for:
1. Contract data collection and svaluation.
2. Level of repair and support policy recommendations.
3. Monitoring the performance of fleet assets.
4. Improvement programs for existing assets and support
systems.
5. Planning maintenance policy and support system
requirements for new weapons systems or equipments.
Ideas and experiences were also solicited by telephone
from the Air Force Logistics Command, Naval Air Test Center,
Naval Avionics Center, ARINC Research Corporation, and
selected program managers and government contractors.
The experiences and concerns of individuals who interact
with RIW assets and contracts are presented alongside the





For a number of years the Department of Defense and the
Navy have attempted to improve equipment reliability and
maintainability and reduce costs by developing and applying
new procurement concepts. Some examples include formal
reliability and maintainability requirements, incentive
contracting, value engineering, system effectiveness
requirements, life cycle cost analysis, design-to-cost and
preplanned product improvement [Ref. 4]. While it is diffi-
cult to assess the full impact of each concept, their
continued use to varying degrees provides some rationale for
concluding that these approaches have been somewhat
successful.
Comparative studies of commercial airlines and military
avionics equipme rt show that the airlines generally experi-
ence better reliability and maintainability. One reason the
airlines have been successful at acquiring protection
against low reliability is through the extensive use of
long-term warranties [Ref. 5]. Such warranties obligate the
contractor to provide maintenance services over a warranty
period or reimburse the airline for necessary unscheduled
maintenance. The warranty has become an important tool for
extending the contractor's responsibility into the opera-
tional time period of his equipment.
The commercial acquistion environment may not be experi-
enced in the military sector, yet many DOD officials believe
it possible to adapt the warranty approach, hoping to
realize the benefits of committing the contractor to produce
the promised reliability. Several Navy programs are trying
13

the warranted approach under the presant terminology of
Reliability Improvement Warranty (RIW).
RIW provides an incentive to contractors to design and
produce eguipment with low failure rates as well as low
costs of repair. It provides for tha repair or replacement
of failed units for an extended period of time (two to five
years) for a fixed, up front cost. The RIW is used mainly
in the marketing of high technology equipments which reguire
a life cycle costing (LCC) approach to item procurement.
The terms Life Cycle Costing (LCC) and Failure Free
Warranty (FFW) are both related to the RIW concept. These
terms are here defined and their interrelationships
explained.
B. LIFE CYCLE COSTING
Life Cycle Costing is a n acquisition method in which the
overall acquisition price considers operations, maintenance,
and other costs of ownership. The objective is to insure
the lowest possible program cost to the government during
the life of the equipment. The total life cycle cost from
conceptual design to retirement is considered and all costs
are given equal attention. Approximately 70 percent of a
system's LCC is determined by the procurement concept chosen
to meet the mission need. Money spent during the early
stages of program development has a leverage effect on the
downstream costs and can save a great deal of money ever the
life of the system.
A broad range of acquisition conoepts are usually solic-
ited from the industrial community and DOD activities to
influence a program's life cycle cost. This competitive
approach provides a wide variety of concepts from which to
select the most feasible method for fulfilling the mission
need, while providing alternative performance levels,
14

schedules, and cost estimates from which to make perform-
ance, cost r and time tradeoffs. [Ref. 3]
C. FAILURE FREE WARRANTY
An early procurement concept used in life cycle costing
was the Failure Free Warranty. It was one of the first
attempts at a long-terra service warranty directed towards
increasing field reliability. FFW was first introduced in
1967 by the Lear Siegler Company [Ref. 6 ]• The nomenclature
caused confusion and the program name was misleading because
it was defined differently than the title implied.
FFW was not a guarantee that equipment would never fail
and there was nothing free about it. Including a FFW clause
in a contract raised the initial acquisition price by about
ten percent [Ref. 7] and did not protect the buyer from
shoddy, defective, or nonconforming material. It was a
warranty of performance as measured by reliability [Ref. 8].
To avoid confusion and errors, the name FFW evolved into
the Reliability Improvement Warranty.
D. RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT WARRANTY
A Reliability Improvenent Warranty (RIW) is a fixed
price commitment that obligates the contractor to repair or
replace, within a specified time, all warranted equipment
that fails during the period of coverage. The objective is
to provide the contractor an incentive to increase reli-
ability by allowing him to maximize his profits.
The RIW is a form of warranty that is consistent with
current Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) requirements.
The Office cf the Secretary of Defense [Ref. 9] describes
the RIW:
A Reliability Improvement Warranty is a orovision in
either a fixed price acquisition or fixed price equip
ment overhaul contract In which:
15

a) the contractor is provided with a monetary incentive
throughout the period of the warranty to improve the
Production design and engineering of the equipment so as
o enhance the field/operational reliability and main-
tainability of the system/equipment; and
b) the contractor agrees that during a specified or
measured period of use, he will repair or replace
(within a specified turnaround timaj all equipment that
fails (subject to specified exclusions, if applicable).
The method employed by the contractor to reduce his
costs depends upon the nature of the particular contract.
It may involve iicproving the reliability of the equipment,
or reducing maintenance, cost of repairs, or turnaround
time. [Hef. 10]
The incentive to improve operational reliability and
reduce repair costs is created by stating in the development
contract that a warranty will be required in the production
contract. When bidding for the production contract the
contractor will bid a fixed warranty price based on the
estimated reliability and axpected number of equipment
returns.
In a RIW the contractor agrees to repair all failures as
contracted under the warranty. If reliability is poor the
contractor will not realize his expected profit since the
increased failure rate increases his repair costs. If an
increase in reliability is experienced his repair costs will
decrease and profits increase. No explicit level of Mean
Time Between Failure (MTBF) is stated in the contract and
the incentive is based upon the profit motive alone.
RIWs are sometimes combined with a guaranteed MTBF. The
same incentives exist, but if the contractor cannot attain
the guaranteed MTBF additional costs or penalties are
assessed. Since the contract is calculated using an
expected MTBF the contractor must meet the goal in addition
to simply balancing repair and modification costs. The RIW
with guaranteed MTBF gives the government greater control
16

over life cycle costs and places the burden for a major









AP27V F-14 Hydraulic Pump x
APN-99 Omega Receiver x
AIX-14 Computer x
APN-154 Radar Beacon x
PV3-044-029 Hydraulic Pump x
AVQ-24 Head Op Display Set x
APN-194 Radar Altimeter x
APN-14 1 Radar Altimeter x
RT-868/APX-76 x
RT-9 88/A X






This table lists the applications of RIW
contracts to U.S. Navy weapon Replaceable
assemblies (WRAsJ since 19b7. Systems are
annotated as to incorporating a RIW. or a
combination RIW with a Mean Time Between
Failure (MTBF) guarantee. [Hef. 5, 12,
13, 14, and 15]
Because the RIW concept forces the manufacturer to
consider reliability and maintainability in terms of profit
from the start of the contract, the military finds the
approach useful for many procurements and the number of
applications is increasing. As with most new concepts there
is a danger of misuse or excessive application. Table I





The RIW concept came to life in the Navy in 1967 as a
Failure Free Warranty (FFW> . I^s major proponent was the
Technical Division of the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) in
Philadelphia. The name Reliability Improvement Warranty
(RIW) was subsequently chosen as a better descriptor of the
concept. The twc names were used interchangably until about
1976, when FFW was dropped from use, and RIW was exclusively
adopted.
B. NAVY PROJECTS
1 . AJB-3 Gyro
FFW was first applied to the AJ3-3 Gyro installed in
the A-4 and F-4 aircraft [Sef. 16] as a trial Navy program
in 1967. In July of 1973 the contract was renewed for
another six years [Ref. 17], and expired in 1979.
2. ABEX Hydraulic Purap_
In April, 1973, the Navy signed a contract for an
RIW F-14 Hydraulic Pump with ABEX Corporation [Ref. 18].
The mid-contract evaluatisn report [Ref. 19] released by ASO
in October, 1977, was very positive and recommended the
further use of RIWs by ASO. In April of 1979, the ABEX
hydraulic pump contract ended. Although no end of contract




3- NASIr lAHPAHT, §nd DRAP
The Naval Air Rework Facility (NARF) , North Island,
California, proposed an organic RIW for two pieces of
receiver/transmitter equipment [Ref. 20] early in 1975.
This offer proposed a three year RIW to NAVAIR and included
a MTBF guaranty. NA7AIR and ASO felt that the proposed
equipments were not the most suitable for RIWs, so the
proposal did not result in a contract.
The Navy's first organic RIW program, Project
RAMPART, began at NARF, North Island, on 24 September, 1975.
This project was a follow-on from NARF's first RIW proposal
earlier in the year, and consisted of overhauling the
APN-141 Radar Altimeter. [Ref. 12]
NARF expanded the original RAMPART program into the
Depot Reliability Assurance Program (DRAP) in 1977. One of
the equipments added at this time was the RT743B/ARC-51
[Ref. 21]. The program was highly successful in improving
the reliability and increasing the MTBF of the fleer's
assets. In early 1982, NARF North Island began phasing out
the DRAP program, because the covered assets were scheduled
for retirement and were being replaced by more modern equip-
ment [Ref. 21]. NARF had determined that at this stage of
the burn-out portion of the equipment's life cycle, reli-
ability improvements were no longer significant enough to be
cost effective.
** • Other Na vy_ Projects
A list of potential RIW equipments was identified by
the Navy early in the F-18 program, but as late as March,
1976, NAVAIR was still urging McDonnell Aircraft Corporation




ARINC Research Corporation recommended to NAVAIR six
equipments on the CH-53E that were prime candidates for RIW
contracts fRef. 23]. This was the first time (October,
1976) that ASO had not spearheaded the selection of RIW
candidate systems,
ASO proposed a list of General Electric F-404 engine
parts for consideration as RIW candidates in November, 1978.
This would have placed their repair in the contractor's
hands vice NARF North Island's, who was then campaigning for
Complete Engine Repair (CER ) of ths F-40 4 [Ref. 24]. The
RIW did not come about, and NARF won the organic, non-RIW
repair contract. In July, 1981, General Electric offered
the Navy the same RIW on the entire F-404 engine (for the
F-18) that they had offered to the Austrailians [Ref. 14].
C. - AIR FORCE EXPERIENCE
The Air Force first tested the RIW concept in their
acquisition process in 1959 [Ref. 25]. They began a formal
trial RIW program in July, 1974, and published a set of
guidelines [Ref. 26] for RIW contracting.
In 1980 the Air Force gave the RIW a new twist by
contracting for an Availability Guarantee during FY1980/8 1
for their Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) [Ref. 27].
This RIW was written so that the reliability of the ALCM was
measured by it's success at passing preventive (static)
maintenance testing, and the ALCM's operational record
during test, practice, and training live firings. The
contractor agreed to a specified reliability, and was obli-
gated to solve any problems causing reliability degradation
and retrofit the solution into existing ALCMs under the RIW.
The second production lot of the Air Force's Advanced Medium
Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM) was to be placed on a type
of availability warranty similar to the ALCM's RIW
[Ref. 27] in May, 1981.
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Pratt & Whitney Aircraft signed a RIW in October, 1980,
on the F-100 engine's high pressure turbine. The Air Forca
also signed with General Electric for an RIW on the entire
TF-34 engine in January, 19 81 [ Hef . 13]. Feeling the heat
of the competition with General ELectric, Pratt & Whitney
Aircraft offered to the Air Force an RIW for tha entire
F-100 engine in March, 1981 [Ref. 14].
0. PONDING AND MANAGEMENT
During the FFW/RIW deve lopmantal pariod, their purchase
was made difficult by funding regulations because of the
multi-year, fixed price characteristics of the contracts
[Ref. 28]. Maintenance could not be purchased with procure-
ment funds, and could only be budgeted on an annual basis.
In response to a Government Accounting Office report on Life
Cycle Costing and an ARINC Research Corporation report on
long-term warranties, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
specified in August, 1973, which funds applied 10 FFWs.
At this time, a memorandum within A50 indicated that
"NAVMAT (MAT-02) has the ball for Navy representation"
regarding FFWs [ Bef- 29]. This shifting of responsibility
for FFWs from ASC to the Naval Material Command does not
appear to have actually happened. The researchers were
unable to discover why this change was indicated, and why it
subseguently did not occur. ASO definitely remained the
focal point for the Navy's FFW/RIW programs.
One year later, DoD published a memorandum regarding the
trial use of RIWs when acquiring electrical equipment
[Ref. 30]- This memorandum expanded further on the avenues
of funding RIWs. In June, 1975, the Technical Division of
ASO requested to be placed in charge of fiscal planning for
RIWs. The multi-year funding aspects of RIW contracts




Also at this time a report was presented by the Naval
Weapons Engineering Support Activity to the Plans and
Programs Office at NAVAIR (AIR-01), entitled: Techniques
For S elect ing and Analyzing Reliability Improvement
Warranties [Bef. 31]. This was designed as an aid to help
program managers in identifying and evaluating RIW candidate
systems. Also promulgated in June, 1975, was a Chief of
Naval Material letter to all commands Titled: Trial CJse of
RIW [Ref. 32], This letter served as notice that NAVMAT was
supportive cf the RIW concept.
The Technical Division cf ASO drew up the first "Failure
Free Warranty Plan" in October, 1975. It was approved by
ASO in March, 1976, and provided a bisis for including
FFW/RIW considerations as they would impact, the FY77 and
future years budcet considerations [Ref. 33]. ilso in
March, the Office of the Secretary of Defense released a
memorandum concerning budgetary planning for RIWs [Ref. 34].
This memorandum defined the FFW/RIW as the procurement of a
reliability improvement plan, instead of the procurement of
maintenance. This was a major step in making the funding of
RIWs both more acceptable and easier to accomplish within
the DoD budgeting and acquisition systems.
The Navy has averaged i bout seven RIW contracts in force
at any given time since 197 3, and the recent surge of
contractors offering RIWs has increased the Navy's interest.
During July of 1982, the Technical Division of ASO had begun
efforts to staff up, to enable them to better monitor the
performance of the Navy's RIWs.
22

7. RIW IMPACT ON CONTRACTING PARTIES
The seven sections of this chapter deal with the impact
of Reliability Improvement Warranties upon the contracting
parties. Section's A through 3 are titled:






7. Transition to Organic Repair
r
A. CONTRACTOR HCTIVATXON AND INITIATIVE
The use of fixed pries warranties, as a method for
assuring the continued operation of an item, is not a new
concept. Everyone, at some time has received a warranty or
purchased a maintenance agreement along with a television
set, stereo, washing machine, or electric appliance.
In the business world, it is common to contract for
maintenance on computers, copying machines, or typewriters.
By so doing, we assure ourselves that we will not be
confronted with an unexpected repair bill. What we have
chosen to do is wager that the price for repairs we might
later have paid without the warranty, is greater than the
price of the warranty. On the other hand, the producer has
wagered that his repair actions will cost less than we paid
for the warranty, resulting in a profit for himself.
The warranty concept is thus a hedge against maintenance
costs. Using this reasoning, many military acquisition
managers have begun to utilize the RIW as a means of
23

controlling maintenance costs. Their belief is that warran-
ties can provide significant benefits in the management of
life cycle costs.
The maior difference between a standard contract and a
P.IW approach to LCC management is that a standard contract
attempts to control support costs by paying close attention
to the eguipment factors that influence these costs. One
recognizes that the frequency of equipment failure and the
expenses involved in repair are prime determinants of
support cost. Therefore, demands or specified minimum
levels cf reliability and maintainability (R & M) are placed
on the equipment based upon the relationship between support
costs and R & M. Typically, in this standard approach, it
is believed that by controlling these characteristics,
support costs are controlled.
In fact, however, the c ontractor controls the R & H
which is built into the equipment. Operation and support
costs depend largely on contractor effort during design,
development, and production, and there is a definite
increase in cost associated with higher levels of
reliability.
While reliability is recognized as an important equip-
ment characteristic and it' s value is specified as a
contractual requirement, reliability demonstration testing
is not as accurate as other equipment parameter tests, and
is time consuming and expensive. There is also disagreement
concerning environmental conditions and what constitutes a
failure. One of the Navy's roadblocks in contolling LCC is
that the contractor has little economic motivation to
improve the equipment characteristics which impact the
support costs. Additionally, the lack of definitive reli-
ability testinq creates uncertainty about the contractor's
success at meeting the contract specifications.
2H

Now, by using a SIH, the Navy places responsibility for
ICC with the contractor, who can batter control costs. The
contractor must bid on providing a specified number of
eguipments and effecting all repairs according to estab-
lished performance requirements. If the contract requires
that all malfunctions be contractor corrected, the Navy
avoids having to define what constitutes a failure. With
this RIW approach, a significant change is made in responsi-
bility for LCC management. The burden for a major portion
of LCC management is shifted to the contractor, who must now
concern himself with the operational and support costs in
addition to the production costs. His responsibility does
not end when production is discontinued. He must make modi-
fications and improvements in the product to correct
malfunctions and meet reliability improvement goals in order
to reduce his repair frequency, and thus reduce his costs.
The theory behind RIWs is to provide the proper motiva-
tion to both buyer and seller with the goal of reducing LCC.
B. RISKS
In recent years, most purchases of military equipment
included a warranty in accordance with the Armed Services
Procurement Requlaticns (AS PR). Warranties addressed the
correction of latent defects of supplied material. The
warranty period was generally one year or less, and equip-
ment often remained unused until much of the period expired.
Tha reliability improvement warranty typically covers
periods of three to five years, greatly expanding the oppor-
tunity to assure that equipment functions properly when
finally placed in use. This ionqer term carries with it a
greater risk for the contractor.
25

Under the terms of a RIW, the equipment producer,
charging a fixed price, assumes responsibility for certain
types of repair services for the warranted equipment over an
extended period. His profits are reduced with each unit
returned for warranty service, thus the contractor must
determine how much to invest in design and production to
achieve a product with a lsvel of reliability that will
maximize profits. If an unexpected reliability problem
arises, he must decide between investing in design changes
to eliminate the problem from the equipment, or investing in
repairs of the problems as they occur.
While the use of long-term warranty contracts has the
potential for favorable results, the data available and the
low number of programs have not been sufficient to permit
firm conclusions about RIW effectiveness. Currently, at
ASO's Technical Division where contract evaluation is
9
performed, emphasis en evaluating RIW contracts has been
relaxed. Since the retirement of the offical who headed the
Division for twenty years, the RIW information data base has
been slow in accumulating. For example, in 1977 the section
completed a mid-contract evaluation of the F-14 engine A3EX
hydraulic pump. This RIW contract was completed in 1979,
but the final contract evaluation report was still pending
in September, 1982. Individuals at ASO explained this delay
of the contract evaluation as a result of revised priorities
and personnel turnover and losses. Although it is not to be
construed that the contract between ASO and &3EX Corporation
was not profitable for both concerns, the effectiveness of
the contract canrot be assessed without a timely data base,
and an organization actively performing the analysis.
In search of a DcD wide RIW information data base, the
authors discovered many references to a joint Air
Force/Industry Product Performance Agreement Center (PFAC)
[Ref. 35]. The FPAC, established at Wright-Patterson Air
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Force Base, Daytcn, Ohio, i s to serve as a DoD/Industry
clearinghouse for product performance data and analysis.
This center is a response by the Air Force Systems Command
and Air Force Logistics Command to the extended use of inno-
vative warranties emphasizing product performance and
reliability. The center, which was to be operational by
mid-1982, is to aid in determining the effectiveness of
existing warranty agreements, centralize a warranty data
base, and suggest improved ways to use warranties. The PPAC
is not a reality yet, and is presently a collateral duty for
a single individual in the Air Force Logistics Command
[Ref. 36]. This situation is similar to the one at ASO in
that RIW effectiveness is difficult O- impossible to measure
due to the lack cf assets available.
The authors fear that R IWs may have achieved a fad
status, and that not enough thought has been given to appli-
cability and tailoring. There is also a genuine regard that
the RIW concept itself may be inappropriate for military
eguipment because of reduced military self-sufficiency and
the risks posed to industry. During an interview conducted
at the Naval Air Test Center, considerable concern was
voiced over the increased potential for the use of RIW as a
cureall to the reliability problem. The authors' sources
felt that reliability may have become the overriding concern
in the acguisition process, while pushing maintainability to
a much lower priority. [Ref. 37]
Specific examples and the thoughts of fleet maintenance
managers are discussed in the Dependency section cf this
chapter.
Some of the common risks to RIW contracting parties are:
1. Government risks:




b) Dependency; Long-term dependence on contractor
support will reduce military self-sufficiency,
especially if strikes occur at the contractor's
plant, or the contractor resolves to discontinue
support.
c) Configuration control; The contractor may use the
design that is lost amenable to his warranty main-
tenance, but is not the most appropriate for
military repair following transition.
d) Transition; The transition from RIW coverage to
organic maintenance introduces a number of admin-
istrative and logistics problems.
e) Administration; The warranty concept introduces
greater complexity into the military logistics
system. The equipment on RIW cannot be supported
through established supply channels.
f) Contractor performance; The contractor may not
perform well because of high repair costs, losses,
contract interpretation, loopholes, or he may set
his priorities on other business.
g) Decreased equipment usage nay cause decreased
failure exposure. The Navy would net receive the
number of repairs or improved reliability that it
had already paid for.
h) Mishandling or tampering by Navy personnel might
cause failures beyond contractor control, and void
the warranty for those itens.
2. Contractor risks:
a) The contractor ma y not estimate the frequency of
failure accurately enough to make his planned
profit
.
b) Equipment may be subject to unforeseen operational
and environmental stresses, causing it to fail
more often than planned.
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c) Increased equipment usage may cause increased
failure exposure.
d) The contractor may bid too low a price due to
competitive pressures, optimistic 8 & M estimates,
or misinterpretation of provisions.
e) Slow government processing of R & 'A Engineering
Change Proposals (ECPs) might hamper the reli-
ability improvement process.
f) The inflation rate may exceed planned levels,
affecting parts, labor, material, and overhaul
costs.
In addition, contractors using RIWs may suffer lost sales
and profit because they are foregoing the opportunity for
additional income from future contracted ECPs, spare parts,
or contracted maintenance [ Ref. 38]. Detailed risk evalua-
tion follows in this chapter.
C. WARB1HTY PRICE
Price is the major risk to the Navy in a RIM contract.
Conceptually, the additional cost of the RIW plus the basic
contract cost should equal less than the cost of the Navy's
organic maintenance plus future possible improvement
contracts plus the basic contract cost.
A RIW price model, presented by ARINC Research
Corporation in a study prepared for the Air Force, was based
on the formula in Figure 5. 1 [Ref. 39]. In this formula,
the risk factor is the single parameter encompassing the
uncertainties associated with determining failure rates,
predicting total operating hours, and estimating cost of
repairs and number of no-iefect returns. These uncertain-
ties relate to considerations such as contractor experience,
adequacy of test provisions, confidence in reliability




























Expect ed Number of Repairs
Cost Per Good Return
Expected Number of Good Returns
Other Direct Yearly Costs
Number of Years of Warranty
Fixed Direct Costs
Figure 5.1 RIW Pricing Formula.
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performance, specifications, schedule, and unit price. This
risk factor has a considerable impact upon the price of the
contract.
It is the assumption of the buyer that such risk uncer-
tainties can be best overcome by using fixed price contracts
which motivate the contractor by allowing him to achieve a
maximum profit. The problem arises, however, that the
amount of risk, rot profit, is the overriding concern for a
contractor. Contractor representatives consistently mention
risk aversion as the most important reason for their will-
ingness to negotiate profit and cost sharing fractions in
incentive type contracts rather than the government's
preferred fixed price arrangements. [ Ref • 40]
A representative of a major defense contractor stated
that risk must b€ reduced before a contractor can afford to
assume the role of a profit maximizes. If the contractor is
forced to accept a fixed price RIB because of provisions in
the production contract, which may not have been in the
development contract, he will provide for as many contingen-
cies as possible. This i= especially true in the absence of
competition when the contractor who developed the system
then moves into production. The contractor will price the
RIW high enough so as not to later jeopardize his profit
position. [Ref. 41]
A recent study reported that industry felt providing a
good product was by far their most important objective.
Secondary objectives were developing a long-term relation-
ship (survivability), improved cash flow, profit, and
development of new capabilities. [Ref. 42]
When engaging in a RIW contract, the contractor will
cover all his risks. "Since the price is determined by the




Due to -the difficulty in projecting and predicting
failure rates and potential reliability improvements, it is
often difficult to assess the risks in order to accurately
price a RIW. For this reason, the Navy risks paying too
much for a warranty in the event the system performs better
than expected.
Even if the RIW is contracted at a fair and reasonable
price, misgivings have been expressed about other factors
which may cause the RIW to be a disadvantage [Ref. 37]. For
example, in discussions wish flee- personnel, many felt that
RIWs may have lead tc increased costs. One reason cited was
that maintenance was being performed at the component or
weapon replaceable assembly (WRA) level rather that at the
internal module level. If lower than expected reliability
results in a large number of failures, the cost of component
spares reguired to maintain the pipeline may make RIW
support uneconomical for both parties. In addition, the
built in test eguipment needed to fault isolate discrepan-
cies to specific HRAs has added to the cost of RIWs.
The expected usage rate of an item is an important
consideration in pricing. Eguipment that remains dormant
for unanticipated long periods of time will not make use of
the repairs and upgrading that has already been paid for by
the RIW. Funding cuts, changes in mission reguirements, or
poor reliability of other systems may result in underutili-
zation of an RIW item.
An example of such a problem was the Air Force's
contract for a gyroscope on the F— 111 aircraft. Airframe
problems reduced the number of flight hours from that antic-
ipated, causing much lower utilization of the gyros during
the warranty period.
The use of a RIW stems from the belief that reliability
improvement is important. If this belief is to be realized
the initial number of items covered by the warranty must be
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large enough to motivate the contractor to invest his
capital in improvements. k RIW system which is subjected to
budget cuts or other interruptions may change the contrac-
tors intent from one of reliability improvement to one of
retrograde repair only. For example, a contractor faced
with making repetitive avionics system repairs involving
only bit piece replacement over a limited number of assets,
would not be motivated to invest in expensive engineering
change proposals. The contractor could ride out the
contract, making only limited repairs within the contracted
turnaround time at minimal expense. [ Ref . 13 ]
The guestion as to whether or not RIWs are worth the
price remains to be answered. ASO and ARINC Research
Corporation have performed several conceptual studies which
indicate that significant cost savings result when items
under 3IW are compared with projections of similar items not
covered by a RIW. In a recent case study of four RIW
contracts (Ref. 44], many common characteristics were found
among the programs. The Key points were:
1. The result of most of the proarams indicated a defi-
nite increase in MTBF.
2. In three of the four cases, many problems plaaued the
contracts .
3. In three of the cases, other factors not related to
the RIW contributed to the improvement in reli-
ability.
4. In all cases the actual cost involved could not
always be agreed upon.
The contracts presented in the case study were:
1. Navy AJB-3 Gyro (Lear-Siegler) .
2. Air Force F— 111 Gyro (General Electric).
3. Navy F-14 Hydraulic Pump (ABEX) .
4. Navy AN/AYK-14(V) Standard Airborne Computer
(Honeywell) .
With such dichotomy existing between these contracts,
serious guestions may be raised as to the cost effectiveness




In anothar study conducted to compare organic mainte-
nance with contractor maintenance involving Air Force
satellite equipment, the analysis of the RIW option
suggested that it off-red only a slight economic advantage
over organic maintenance [Ref. 11].
One researcher encountered considerable doubt among Navy
R & M personnel regarding the motives of contractors. They
felt contractors could hold back on initial equipment reli-
ability while profiting on the production contract. They
could then earn substantial profits by quickly improving the
reliability to meet the contracted improvement goals.
[Hef. 44]
D. DEPEHDEHCI





Maintenance actions are identified as either preventative or
corrective. Preventative actions seek to prevent failure
while corrective actions attempt to repair a failed piece of
equipment.
The evolution of electronics from discrete components to
integrated circuits has fostered the implementation of a
modular replacement maintenance philosophy in the event of
equipment failure. This philosophy was pursued while the
availability of resources declined during the 1970's. It
resulted in many system's organizational and intermediate
maintenance levels being limited to the performance of only
routine preventative maintenance functions and replacement
of failed modules. Corrective maintenance actions on those
modules have become a depot level only responsibility.
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Usurping the intermediate level's repair capabilities
reduces the maintenance program to a two-tiered system
connected by a logistic distribution pipeline that is
growing in length and diameter. "Q.23.bat engagements would
quickly sever this 'umbilical to the beach*". Admiral Isaac
C. Kidd used this phrase to describe the supply- and depot-
level maintenance pipeline during his tenure as Chief of
Naval Material [ Bef • 45]. Increased use of commercial depot
maintenance (RIW), has removed the fleet even further from
their support sources.
The concept of RIW as a commercial depot level repair
works only if the manufacturer receives the retrograde item
back in his facility. This allows the contractor to make
the required engineering studies in an attempt to determine
what can be done to improve reliability. This of course
precludes the Navy from effecting repairs and acquiring
experience in supporting it's weapons systems. Many RIW
critics believe the Navy may become too dependent upon the
contractor.
In one interview [Ref. 46], a fleet maintenance manager
expressed his corcern over the increased use of contractor
support for fleet assets. He believed the Navy risked
becoming dangerously dependent upon contractors for repair
of operational assets, and indicated that a lack of fleet
repair capability might seriously degrade remote or indepen-
dent operations. He suggested the possibility that
contractors dealing with new technology may tend to maneuver
themselves into a position of becoming the only source of
repair. Among many fleet level managers, the belief
surfaced that the Navy's shipboard maintenance capaDility is
being inadvertently taken away. The fleet's widespread
policy of accomplishing most tasks at the lowest economical
level of the command structure may have been circumvented by
certain acquisition concepts involving contractor mainte-
nance, such as RIWs.
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When considering a RIW candidate, a detailed Logistic
Support Analysis is performed to determine a sufficient
sparing level so that factors such as Mean Time To Repair
(MTTR), Turn Around Time (TAT), Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF) , etc., will have minimal effect on readiness.
Several unplanned events might happen, causing the number of
spares to be inadequate. Events such as strikes at the
commerical overhaul sites, freight embargoes, severe
weather, natural disasters, or enemy attack, would impact
heavily on fleet readiness.
For example, the commercial facility overhauling the
Magnavox AQA-7 DIFAR system (not RIH) severely degraded
readiness when workers in the production and repair opera-
tion went on strike. Since the contractor warranty required
the return of all retrograde assets to the manufacturer's
plant, the assets piled up on the contractor's loading dock
until negotiations settled the labor dispute. [ Ref . 47]
The situation may be aggravated further if such events
as just described are incorporated into the exclusion clause
of the RIM. Hhen such unpredictable events occur, the
contractor is not responsible for mesting the time
constraints for item repair and return that is otherwise
enforceable under the contract. Exclusion clauses remove
the pressure from the contractor to meet contract require-
ments through sub-contracting, alternate transportation,
etc. As included in one contract, delays attributed to
events beyond the control of and without fault or negligence
by the contractor are not counted in the RIW turnaround-time
calculations [Ref, 48]. Pipeline delays are of major
concern to fleet maintenance managers, but the SI1 does net
cure this ill.
Some of the exclusions written into a RIW exclude damage




1. Fire or Explosion
2. Submersion or Flood
3. Aircraft crash or Combat damage
4. Tampering by government personnel (seal breakage)
5. Physical damage caused by accidental or willful
mistreatment.
Items four and five are freguent occurances. Tampering by
maintenance personnel is often dons by personnel who are
unaware that the unit is under a RIW, or realize the item is
warranted, but do not understand the rules of -the game.
Tampering also occurs by direction of the technician's
superiors in a desperate attempt to EFI (Ready For Issue)
the asset in order to get a system operating again
[Ref. 49].
The RIW concept depends upon shipment of the retrograde
eguipments to the contractor through normal supply channels.
When operating at sea for long periods of time and at
extended supply lines, contractor maintenance can have a
detrimental effect if adequate spares are not available
on-board the ship. Furthermore, the Naval Supply System
does not have a specific asset management program, such as
the Closed Loop Aeronautical Management Program (CLAMP), to
expedite RIW retrogrades through the system. Given the fact
that the contractor's turn-around tine is calculated only
from the time an asset arrives on his loading dock until the
time it is made ready for shipment, Lengthy and unacceptable
turn-around times are usually not a result of contractor
inability, but caused by extended logistics channels. For
this reason, persons interviewed at the Naval Material
Command were opposed to RIWs for support of surface and
sub-surface forces. [Ref. 49]
No pro RIW feeling for the use o£ RIWs as a means of
increasing reliafcili-y could be obtained from interviewees
at NAVMAT. One previ us researcher was told by a Navy reli-
ability and lain tain ability expert:
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My policy is that I am not against warranties or guaran-
tees if we can get them { from contractors). Reliability
Improvement Warranties, in the strict definition, are
current gimmicks, with which some think we get something
for nothing. Others think we get nothing for something
(with RIWs) . I think RIWs are somewhere in between.
[Ref. 44]
Most engineers at NAVMAT fait RIM connotated that a
system initially was not designed properly. They felt that
if the money was put up front to design a system properly
and that adequate competition was available to maintain
design inovation, you would not need RIWs. [Ref, 44]
Another problem created by the use of RIW is that of
assessing the contractor's ability to meet surge reguire-
ments in the case of a sustained conflict or war. Critics
of full commercial depot level maintenance, such as RIWs,
believe the only means to insure surge maintenance capa-
bility lies with organic depot facilities. Their reasons
are:
One, since a full wartime support capability is
reguired, only a government depot could be required and
counted on to retain such a reserve capability at all
times. Two, since government depot employees are not
allowed to strike, critical support of weapons systems
would be assured at ail times. Three, since government
depots are under full government control, they cannot
refuse to do some work on the grounds that it is not
economical to do so. [Ref. 50]
For most existing weapons systems, the guestion of main-
taining a surge repair capability is not usually a difficult
one because contractor support has been used concurrently
with in-house repair. However, with the use of long-term
RIW contracting for new procurement, the military dees not
develop organic repair until long after the item has been in
the inventory. As a result, the military loses control over
ensuring surge capability exists because organic repair
would have to start from square one during a crisis. A
study reviewing the Air Force Inertial Navigation System
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[Ref. 50] concluded that the contractor would be unable to
meat generated surge demands. Even operating at 150 percent
of his then current production level, the contractor would
be unable to meet operational requirements. Conversely, if
an organic maintenance capability had existed prior to the
surge requirement, shortages might not have occured.
Although the study may or may not be applicable to other
items under commercial warranty, one interviewee expressed
deep concern over a contractor's unwillingness to respond
outside the scope of his contract. Economic pressures,
competing production lines, or skilled manpower shortages
may affect the willingness or ability of a commercial over-
haul facility to respond to surge requirements in the most
economical manner [Ref. 43]. In contrast, organic military
depot maintenance facilities stand ready to respond to fleet
requirements.
From a readiness point of view, it is clear that DoD
should maintain an industrial base capability to respond to
surge requirements. Recent emphasis on productivity and
readiness, such as the Agnisition Improvement Program's
Action 3—Multiyear Procurement; Action 4— Program
Stability; Action 5— Encourage Capital Investment to Enhance
Productivity; and Act_:ri 32—Increase Competition in the
Acquisition Process; all work to create a climate of greater
program stability ano more effective competition in which
companies will vie f :r defense contracts. The Deputy
Secretary of Defense emphasized the need to integrate
industrial base productivity and DoD responsiveness issues,
stating:
We must weave industrial base considerations into the
acquisition process, revit«
planning, ana show industr 1
actions that industrial ? r<




It is evident from recent changes to the DoD acquisition
policy that the defense industry and military readiness are
intimately dependent upon each other. More people are real-
izing that system support must be given equal attention when
addressing other parameters such as cost, schedule, and
performance. While it is imperative that defense contrac-
tors and program managers work together, the use of RIWs and
the consequent exclusive contractor support cause many to
question the necessity or the prudence of the RIW acquisi-
tion concept.
The using commands naturally view this (RIW) as a loss
of self-sufficiency. The accomplishment of their
mission is more vulnerable to the economic health of the
RIW contractor, to strikes, and to other vagaries of
civilian commerce over which they have nc control.
[Ref. 11]
By properly executing the actions necessary to broaden
the defense industrial base, as well as those actions
required to maintain sustained fleet survivability, a fine
liae of balance must be achieved when utilizing contractor
and orqanic maintenance.
E. CONFIGURATION CONTROL
Most military RIW applications have made use of standard




Deviations, and Waivers ; and MIL-STD-4 8 3— Configuration
Majicic[£ine,Jit. Practices for Sy stem Equipment, Munitions, and
Computer Progra ms. The objective is to assure that the
configuration status of the equipment is known and is compa-
table with the intended main+enance concept as well as
inter-system interface control [Ref. 39].
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Contractor initiated engineering change proposals to
improve the reliability and maintainability, at no addi-
tional contract cost, are encouraged under the BIW.
Conceptually, the normal MIL-STD-480 procedures apply, with
two exceptions:
1. The contractor must include his recommendation on
incorporating the ECP into all government/Navy owned
spares.
2. Each ECP will be automatically incorporated in the
contract after 35 iays, unless the contractor is
notified cf its nonapproval before that time.
The ECPs should be installed in all new production units
and in all units returned fcr repair. To ensure that the
entire inventory can be brought to a standard configuration
at a reasonable price upon the completion of the RIW, the
contractor may be required to submit a schedule of
modification-kit prices that are effective through the RIW
expiration date (Ref. 52].
Most RlWs require the contractor to maintain configura-
tion control by serial number. All ohanges to design,
configuration, parts, technical orders, or support equipment
that are Class I changes, (affect form, fit, cr function),
must be submitted to the activity with design control for
approval. Changes not affecting fori, fit, cr function,
(Class II), are accomplished, documented, and reported to
the program office in a timely manner. The intention is
that RIW items returned foe repair will be brought up to the
latest approved configuration, unless otherwise specified.
At the end of the RIW, any remaining RIW assets in the
inventory that are not: of the latest configuration must be
modified by the government, using kits and information
supplied by the contractor, at no additional cost to the
government. [Ref, 4 8]
Although the contract nay be written with the intent of
providing maximum configuration control, many individuals
involved with the management of fleet assets expressed
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considerable skepticism regarding the configuration control
issue. One engineer expressed his concern over the contrac-
tor's decision making ability with regards to form, fit, or
function determinations. k basic pracept of RItf contracting
is allowing the manufacturer to make unsolicited design
modifications. A potential problem arises, because the
contractor's view of a change may be one with which the
program officer does not agree. Design changes incorporated
without proper coordination between the contractor's engi-
neers and government experts can create serious problems.
[Ref. 53]
One individual concerned with the logistics support of
maturing weapon systems f aa rs that the information
concerning unmodified assets, as well as updated systems,
might not be accurately maintained by the manufacturer.
Concern was expressed over systems covered by SIf contracts
which may not be receiving the necessary administration,
resulting in varied and untraceable configurations within
the inventory. Such a situation could cause overwhelming
trouble during transition to organic maintenance. [Ref. 37]
Of the many issues related to RItf contracting, configu-
ration control surfaced as one of the most frequently voiced
complaints among logistics managers. The policy of allowing
manufacturers to modify systems and components, except for
external form, fit, or function changes, is contrary to a
maintenance policy of standardization, and may jeopardize





1 • Organizational and Inte rmediate Levels
At the organizational level, RIW equipment requires
additional failure documentation. The Navy's aviation
Maintenance/Material Management (3-M| system does not
provide failure information in a timely enough manner to
meet the contractor's requirement for failure data to accom-
pany each returned asset. The Navy's Visual Information
Display System/Maintenanca Action Form (VIDS/MAF) does not
provide the detailed information that the contractor •
requires. When a RIW asset fails and is removed from an
aircraft, the technician must complete a contractor supplied
failure report in addition to a VIDS/MAF. The quality of
the contractor's field failure data is therefore solely
dependent upon the accuracy of the extra paperwork required
of the aircraft technicians. Most fleet aviation mainte-
nance managers agree that, in light Df the operational tempo
and manning level of Navy squadrons, even the normal
VIDS/MAF load is an administrative burden. Imposing addi-
tional RIW documentation requirements upon the
organizational level is detrimental to the accuracy and
quality of the data provided. If RIW equipment is inducted
into the Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) for a
contractor required test or fault determination, a similar
specialized document is required.
2. Shi pment and Sup ply
It is not uncommon for maintenance paperwork
(VIDS/MAFs) to become lost during shipment. If this
happens, the maintenance data can often be reconstructed by
accessing the 3-M data base. The Navy keeps no such data
base of the contractor's completed RIW failure reports. If
the RIW documentation is lost, there is no backup method
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available to recoup the information. Such a loss might
prompt the contractor to diligently pursue the lost data, in
a sincere effort to determine failure causes and improve his
products reliability. A contractor might, however,
consider the item a non- failure because of the missing
paperwork. He could then trite off the asset's failure by
making no failure entries in the data base. This action
circumvents the failure's lowering the MTBF and avoids
impacting the attainment of his reliability improvement
goals.
Regarding shipment of failed units, the entire
process can be very difficult because contractor supplied
shipping containers are often reguired. Storage space is at
a premium aboard ship, and the management of reusable
containers has always been a difficult task. Organically
maintained eguipment can usually be safely crated for ship-
ment in the event that a suitable reusable container is not
immediately available. This is generally not possible with
RIW eguipments, which can only be shipped via contractor
supplied containers. Any packaging latitude taken by the
ship's personnel can void the RIW.
Amazing as it may seem, the Navy might not get it's
moneys worth from a ?~W by pure chance, depending upon the
luck of the draw in a rotatable pool. Many avionics systems
(black boxes) are hel; in a supply department rotatable
pool. There are usu.._l/ several assets of each type eguip-
ment, the number depending upon the historical usage rate.
An organizational level technician brings his failed unit
directly to the rotatable pool and, in a one-for-one
exchange, receives an operational unit. If the asset's
entire population is not. covered by the RIW, there will be a
mixture of RIW and ncn-RIW assets in the pool. Warranted
assets will most likely never be given issue priority ever
non-RIW assets by the person managing the pool. Thus, a
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component whose multi-year maintenance has already been paid
for may sit on a shelf, while the component issued may soon
fail, and require organic repair. This is clearly a very
unaconomical practice. The Navy will not derive full
benefit from a RIW unless the assets remain installed in
operating aircraft.
There are no special supply channels set up to
handle RIW equipment, which typically cannot be routed
through normal channels. CLAMP (Closed Loop Aeronautical
Management Program) persona el are often "conscripted" to
handle and track RIW assets. The CLAMP administrator at NAS
North Island was required to process NAR? North Island DRAP
equipments. Their staff was not increased to handle the
load, causing la^or disruptions to the CLAMP unit's routine.
3 . Contractor
The DRAP managers at NAR? North Island conceded that
they would be happy when the program draws to a close,
because their staff had not been increased to handle the
additional administrative requirements [Ref. 43]. A defense
industry contracting officer related that the administrative
burdens placed upon the contractor were massive. If his
firm had their choice, they would rather never have to
administer a RIW [Ref. 41]. Serial number configuration
control and ECP incorporation status tracking were very
tedious, labor intensive, and expensive.
** • Navy-wid e RIW Manage me n t
Guaranties in general are difficult to administer
because of the calculations required for 3T3F determination.
Not only must fa41ed items be considered in the equa-
tion, but operating units as well. However, current
reporting systems do not provide information on utiliza-
tion of items that are still installed and operating.
Therefore, any statistical estimate of the MTBF must be
based on a small sample of the population. [Ref. 31]
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This situation is partially avoided when the data for all
equipment is keyed to unique serial numbers. Still, the
installed assets will have accrued an unknown amount of
operational time, and any numbers usad in the MTBF calcula-
tion can be only estimates. An additional problem arises if
ECPs have already modified some units and not others. The
MTBF would then te based on a heterogeneous grouping of
varying MTBF functions.
The authors spent considerable time telephoning
program management offices and reading the literature,
trying to isolate which equipments were RIW contracted; a
current Navy RIW list does not exist. Although the Master
Repairable Items List (MRIL) does identify RIW items as
such, the items are not broken out. The only possibility
would be to "try a special central computer run at ASO"
[Ref. 53} to isolate them.
The fact that RIWs are managed by exception, rather
than being institutionalized, makes their administration
difficult. Currently, there is no designated central
clearing point for RIW information where a program or logis-
tics manager can get advice and policy consultation.
G. TRANSITIOH TO ORGANIC REPAIR
Prior to RIW expiration, the government must decide
whether to renew the RIW contract for another period, or
cease reliability improvement efforts. When equipment
reaches the age and condition where reliability improvements
are not cost effective, the choice is either to continue
contractor maintenance, or transition to organic repair.
Even before the RIW contract is negotiated, analysis
should provide seme idea as to the best time to transition
to organic support, and what the transition will cost
[Ref. 54]. The authors did not discover a single case where
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this had been done. As pointed out in this study, the
government has seldom done this type of analysis to help
decide whether to renew a R Iff contract or transition to
organic support. The only analytical projection of the
optimum point in time to discontinue a Riff was performed by
NAfiF North Island's DRAP managers.
1- Entir e Population Riffs
When eguipment transitions to full support organic
maintenance, the provisioning data provided by the
contractor is usually very accurate. In contrast, non-Riff
acquisition support requiraments are derived from very
narrow data, based upon prototype equipment, with little or
no field data. A more accurate determination of required
spares and support parts can be made from the data gathered
during several years of a Riff.
Repair methods and manuals may also be fairly well
established. The Nav ioas not need to design the mainte-
nance plan from scrato.i if good information has been
purchased in the Riff. Unless the government is very careful
and specific about transition aspects in the original
warranty, the contractor's repair methods may be incompat-
ible with existing Navy procedures and equipment. If the
contractor uses very unusual or non-standard techniques, the
transition costs for procurement of specialized equipment
and skill training will ba very high. The Navy, during the
Riff negotiation, might prepare for transition by specifying
that the eguipment be manufactured and repaired using
methods compatible with tha avaiiabia organic test equipment
ani repair methods. This is contrary, however, to one of
tha fundamental axioms of the Riff; the contractor should be
allowed the latitude to take whatever steps are required to
improve reliability. Suppose the Navy did in fact own some
equipments required for tast and rapair of the RIW assets.
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Unless these are supplied to the contractor as Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE) , they will lie dormant or underu-
tilized, incurring a lost opportunity cost to the
government.
Transition often gains the Navy little independence
from the critical WRA pipeline. Few RIW equipments incorpo-
rate any type of intermediate maintenance, so transition
involves a government da pot facility replacing the commer-
cial contractor. For the full population RIW, transitioning
addresses only one facet of the fores dependency problem.
Deployed units will gain independence only if the
Intermediate Maintenance Activities (IMAs) can take over
some of the contractor's repair functions. The tendency to
retain a two-tier maintenance policy (organizational/depot)
after transition is easy to understand and, on the surface,
appears cheaper. The long range cost effects of not incor-
porating the IMAs into the repair cycle bears closer study.
A mid-life cycle transition to organic maintenance
contains hidden costs. For example, the life of a system
might be fifteen years, utilizing a RIW for the first five.
After transition, the government aould realize only two
thirds the utilization of their fixed plant (compared to
full life cycle organic maintenance) . Additionally, the
Navy already paid fixed plant costs to the contractor in the
RIW price. Although the RIW may stipulate that the
contractor provide ECP kits, data, manuals and test and
repair equipment during transition, these costs have also
been included by the contractor in the RIW price. The fixed
plant costs paid to the contractor cannot be recovered,




2- P art ial Eopulatior. RIWs
When only part of the equipment population is
covered fcy a RIW, the government already has repair methods,
supply support, and training in place before the transition.
Organic repair capabilities must then be expanded to handle
the surge of additional equipments. Contractor-provided ECP
kits must be installed in non-RIW aquipments to bring the
population to a common configuration. This twin load of
greatly increased population and ECP kit installation may be
a very heavy burden on the fleet.
The complete duplication of supply and support
systems for the warranted and non-warranted WRAs is ineffi-
cient. This situation provides good surge demand
protection, but the government pays a good deal extra to put
the capability into the contractor's plant.
U9

71. DISCUSSION OF LESSONS LEARNED
This chapter presents some lessons learned from past and
ongoing RIW contracts. These lessons provide a valuable
insight into the use of RIWs and serve as a means for meas-
uring their effectiveness. They also may be used to
determine whether a RIW, as an acquisition and support
concept, has been responsive to the needs of operational
units.
RIW benefits are expected to be achieved by providing
contractors with monetary incentives to improve equipment
reliability and maintainability, thus reducing the number
and costs of repairs. Two important requirements in deter-
mining the appropriateness of a RIW for a particular program
are
:
1. The concept should be cost affective.
2. The information necessary to assess the contractor's
RIW effectiveness (e.g., Mean rime Between Failure)
should be readily obtainable. [Ref. 55]
A- TIMELT DATA BASE
A 1979 audit, performed by the Air Force Audit Agency on
three RIW contracts, found that a definite plan to evaluate
the impact of the RIW concept had not been prepared. The
audit concluded that the specific lata to be retained had
not been determined by the Air Force Logistics Command.
Data that is identified for retention significantly influ-
ences the scope of a:.v future evaluation, and the ability to
assess the value of existing RIW programs may be reduced if
data selected for retention are not based on the objectives
of a master plan. The audit also concluded that adequate
procedures must be developed for gathering and storing data.
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After the Air Force audit was accomplished, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense initiated actions to evaluate
RIW effectiveness. A previous pilot tri-service RIW collec-
tion center was operated in late 1975, but was not continued
beyond 1977. The Air Force is presently organizing a
DoD/Industry wide clearinghouse for RIW contracting informa-
tion. This Product Performance Agreement Center (PPAC) is
intended to assist program offices in selecting and negoti-
ating effective warranties and product performance
provisions. The Center's intended use is to determine the
effectiveness of existing DoD warranty agreements and to
improve the use cf future agreements. As revealed in
Chapter V, the PPAC is unfortunately neither staffed nor
operational at this writing. Additionally, current Navy RIW
contract evaluation is almost non-existent. The Aviation
Supply Office and NAVAIR are currently not analyzing RIW
performance and contract ef fectiveness [Ref. 53] and
[Ref. 56].
B. ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
The full impact of the administrative requirements
imposed by RIWs is not accurately considered in the life
cycle cost model. The Air Force found in their audit of the
AN/ARN 118 Tactical Air Navigation System, C-130 Omega
Navigation Set, and the C-141 Altitude and Heading Reference
System, that numerous RIW administrative and personnel costs
were not considered in the analysis prior to contract award.
For example, seven additional personnel (annual salary of
$200 r 000) were required to accumulate and report. RIW data.
However, life cycle cost computations used to assess the
cost effectiveness of RIW prior to contract award did not
include these costs, which might have significantly influ-
enced the decision of whether a RIW was the most cost
effective contracting approach. [Ref. 55]
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In the Navy»s Depot Reliability Assurance Program
(DRAP), numerous administrative hours were expended in
attempts to track Pacific Fleet assets. A constant moni-
toring of each RIW component by serial number was required
to prevent the migration of warranted equipments outside the
Pacific Fleet. This type of strict aanagement attention was
not considered or costed out during the program's inception
and development. [Ref. 43 ]
Also, increased management and administrative require-
ments at the organizational and intermediate level are not
accurately addressed. Presently, the only means for an
unknowing maintenance or supply technician to determine
whether a component is under a RIW or not is by referring to
the Master Repairable Items List (MRIL) . Maintenance and
supply support personnel are often unaware they are dealing
with a RIW asset. Special procedures and additional educa-
tion must be emphasized, together with appropriate increases
in priority for handling ind shipping of all RIW units.
C. POPULATION COVERAGE
An area that causes serious RIW aanagement problems is
population coverage. Many RIW contracts cover only a part
of the equipment population by serial number or over a
period of years. Rather than restrict RIW modules to
specific warranted Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs) , and
subsequently warranted WRAs to designated warranted
aircraft, the RIW permits a complete interchange to take
place. For example, in the F-16 aircraft, a warranted
module may be used to repair an unwarranted WRA, and that
WRA can be used in a warranted aircraft. Such a situation
also occured in the DRAP program. The most difficult
management problem was preventing the migration of RIW
assets out of NARF North Island's control.
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Such possibilities create a potential gaming situation
between industry and the military, and can cause numerous
administrative difficulties. Thus, it is generally advi-
sable to extend RIW coverage to an entire population for a
shorter calendar period, rather that lengthen the period at
the expense of net covering the entire inventory. According
to an analysis of the F-16 program, the coverage period
should always be long enough to assure a contractor that he
has the potential for realizing economic benefits from the
no-charge-to-the-government ECPs [Ref. 57].
D. DIFFICULTY IB PRICING THE BIS
The difficulty in projecting and predicting failure
rates and the potential for reliability improvements makes
it almost impossible to accurately cost out RIW provisions.
The application cf RIW to state-of-the-art technology has
resulted in a high risk factor being utilized by most
contractors. Improved testing under realistic operational
conditions has produc:-i more reliable failure data and
reduced the wide confidence interval of achievable failure
rates.
One EIW study [Ref- 58] determinsd that the incentive to
improve testing in the developmental stage of an acquisition
is positive when the contractor expects a procurement
warranty to be applied. In order to adequately price out
the RIW, the contractor mast estimate the cost of a RIW from
a projected reliability baseline. At best, the costing
figure will be a gross estimate, but the range can be
considerably narrowed if the contractor has a high degree of
confidence in his projected failure rate based upon real-
istic operational testing. The researcher quoted an Mr
Force Logistics Command engineer as saying:
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I am somewhat surprised in discussions with members of
industry, to find that the RIW is perceived more as a
threat than a business oDportunity. Typically, the
major concern appears to be with the magnitude of risk
that RIW poses to the firm and with means to pass that
risk back to tie government or to sub-tier vendors.
This concern is reflected in the risk premiums contained
in the warranty pricing. In soma instances, the risk
premiums have been so excessive as to negate any utility
in choosing the RIW approach. (Ret. 58]
E. TIMING OP THE RIW CONTRACT
As in all programs, a competitive environment influences
the actions of the individual contractors throughout the
acquisition cycle. In a competitive market, efforts to
perpetuate a product line or acquire a new technology may
influence decisions during engineering development. Too
often, RIW prices in the early stages of the acquisition
cycle are priced so as to stay competitive, without a full
appreciation of later development and production impacts.
Under these circumstances, the relationship of equipment
performance and contract dasign requirements, as well as the
relationship of price to estimated costs, including the risk
coverage, may be heavily biased in order to respond to the
competition. As an example, the F-16 RIW was procured prior
to full scale development, while competition still existed.
Although the risks of suca an early commitment were well
recognized, the importance of obtaining RIW prices in a
competitive environment ware considered paramount. A number
of actions were taken to kaep risks under control, but these
may not have prevented the ability of the contractor to
recover any losses through modification of RIW contract
requirements. A final s-udy of the F-16 [Ref. 57] recom-
mended that a RIW procurement should not be attempted prior
to single-source contracting unless the product's design was
reasonably stable, contractor risks were well defined and
5U

controlled, and there was little likelihood of changing
contract reguirements.
F. RIW EXTENSIONS
Modifying a contract with a sole-source supplier may
lead to difficulties. With the F-16 aircraft, there were
circumstances involving the European partners that forced
such a change. Specifically, because of the severely
compressed initial procurement schedule and the uncertainty
about European interest and involvement in the F-16 RIW
program, the original RIW terms and conditions involved only
U.S. Air Force aircraft. When it was decided that the
European aircraft purchases would be fully merged within the
U.S. Air Force RIW contract, the decision caused a renegoti-
ation of the RIW. Such a renegotiation may cause the
effectiveness of a RIW to be lost. The contractor's motiva-
tion during contract modification may not be as economical
to the government a s it was during initial contract
negotiations. [ Hef . 57]
A similar situation occurs when RIWs are considered for
multi-service procurements: witness the NA7STAR GPS (Global
Positioning System) . The program is headed by the Air
Force, which regards the use of a RIW most favorably. The
Navy, however, is undecidei upon which maintenance concept
to develop: organic or commercial. The Army is also
involved in the GPS procurement. 3" it h such a wide range of
applications and maintenance philosophies, it appears the
use of fixed price RIW contracting may present too many
difficulties to overcome in multi-service contracts.
The uncertainty of available funding for RIW extension
upon the expiration of a contract has many maintenance
managers worried. If the contractor substantially raises
the price of commercial support during RIW extension
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negotiations, the military may, for economic reasons, be
faced with a very difficult decision. One recourse is
organic support, which without a well planned and long
lead-time transition would seriously degrade operational
capabilities. Another choice is to establish alternate
commercial repair capabilities; this would probably be
acquired at a surstan-ial premium also.
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¥11. ALTERNATIVES TO RIWS
Is there a better way to motivate contractors towards
improving the reliability of their products? This chapter
touches upon some alternate avenues of ensuring equipment
reliability.
A. COMMERCIAL AIRLINE IARR ANTIES
There might be a correlation between warranties and
increased MTBF in commercial airline avionics, but causality
has not been clearly established [Rsf. 11 ]-
Commercial avionics characteristics are determined by
the Airline Electronic Engineering Committee. These charac-
teristics are form, fit, and function type standards to
which designers and suppliers provide equipment that is
interchangeable between manufacturers. The benefit of
interchangeability is that it enhances the competitive
atmosphere, since a poorly performing item can be easily
replaced by a competitor's item. [Ref. 59] Thus competi-
tion, not warranties, is probably responsible for high
reliability in ccmmercial avionics equipment [Ref. 54], The
same degree of competitive interchangeability does not exist
in most military equipment acquisitions.
B. GRADUAL TRANSITION FROM RI3 TO ORGANIC REPAIR
One alternative contrasting technique is to make the
first few years of a RIW program the same as they are now
managed. Then, based upon returned failures at the end of
this period, different modules and System Replaceable
Assemblies (SRAs) would be stocked in the supply system for
issue to the Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) .
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The IMA would then fault diagnose WRA failures, replace the
failed module or SRA, and return the failed SRAs to the
contractor for RIW repair. Those WRAs that the IMA could
not repair would also return to the contractor for RIW
repair. Maintainability da sign and contract arrangements
would protect the contractor from organic maintenance
induced failures. This RIM method would allow the military
to become involved in the maintenance, and influence repair
activities, much earlier than normally experienced with
RIWs. [Ref. 60] It would also allow stockage of smaller
sub-assemblies at a much lower total inventory cost than
stocking only complete WRAs for spares. This proposal
provides for emergency cannibalization when the supply lines
become disrupted, yet continues returning unserviceable
components to the contractor so that he may conduct engi-
neering studies and propose ECPs. [Ref. 54]
C. FIXED PRICE INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
The Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract does not allow the
government to get the actual contract cost information from
the contractor at the end of the contract. A Fixed Price
Incentive (FPI) contract does. With actual cost informa-
tion, the government is in a better position to judge its
costs for organic maintenance, and has better data with
which to negotiate new RIW contracts. The CJ.S. Army used
this concept with the Black hawk helicopter RIW. It was
negotiated as a cne year contract nith three separate one .
year extension options. The Army thus was not locked into
contractor support for longer than one year. [Ref. 54 ]
The particular Army command awarding the RIW felt that
FPI contracts were cheaper to the government, in the long
run, than FFP contracts.
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For developmental items, the FPI contract seems to be
the best contract. It recognizes the contractor's risks
and provides the government with actual cost data.
However, reducing the contractor's risk through a FPI
contract may reduce the contractor's motivation.
[Ref. 54]
D. RECENT ENGINE WARRANTIES
In the mid-1970s a Navy study reported:
In many airline warranties, provision is made for
airline maintenance on warranted units. The vendor than
reimburses the airline for maintenance cost. Most
contractors have expressed reluctance to enter into such
an arrangement with the military, because they feel that
the high turnover rate in maintenance personnel would
adversely affect repair Drocedures. (Ref. 31]
Air Force engine contracts have recently used both
this method and an opposing one for performing repairs.
"With the F100, plans call for Pratt & Whitney to do the
work, while General Electric will reimburse the Air Force
for work done at service depots." [Ref. 13] General
Electric was to grant 100 percent allowance for materials
and depot labor for TF3U engines. One factor that required
negotiation in the other contract was how to cope with the
lingering effects of the early 1979 s-rikes at two Pratt &
Whitney subcontractors. Despite this problem and the
historic desire of the military services to perform their
own maintenance, the Air Force Aeronautical Systems Division
cited one major advantage inherent in the Pratt S Whitney
contract. The existence of a sizable maintenance demand on
the F100 would provide a commercial overflow, or surge capa-
bility if needed. [Ref. 13]
General Electric's F404 engine warranty proposal to the
Royal Australian Air Force (RAA?) was presented as two
options. Each option covered parts and labor for any
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primary and secondary damage to the full engine. The
proposal stated;
1. The engine and all components would be warranted for
750 hours or 2000 Tactical Air Command Cycles,
whichever came first.
2. Australia would be guaranteed that maintenance costs
over the same usage period would not exceed a cost
based on General Electric's rsliability projections.
If the costs did exceed that figure, General Electric
would pay the difference up to a limit, or cap.
The cap was a type of contractor liability limit, which was
set well above the contractor's price for the warranty.
Although the warranty was with the RAAF, they planned to
subcontract the engine maintenance work to an Australian
contractor. General Electric' s intention was that RAAF
personnel or Australian industry do the maintenance and be
reimbursed or, under the second option, be credited toward
the cap. [Ref. 14]
E. USING THE PRESENT SYSTEM
Several short term RIWs have shown large MT3F improve-
ments with no ECPs. The improvements were incorporated
during design and production by placing a greater emphasis
on reliability and strictly enforcing reliability design
specifications. Are RIW type special programs necessary for
good reliability? Perhaps better design specifications and
improved enforcement of standards could do the same job more
easily and at lower cost. [Ref. 61]
The Navy's organic repair facilities and IMA/Depot
infrastructure cculd more aggressively pursue equipment
reliability impr cvements
,
perhaps making RIW type programs
obsolete. Instead of a particular equipment problem going
on for years without an engineering change, the organic
maintenance system could become more sensitive and respon-
sive to reliability improvement needs.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS M5 RECOMMENDATIONS
Considerable experience and data have been gained since
the introduction of the FFW/RIW as an acquisition concept.
Much of the significant data originating from RIWs, used in
the acquisition cf both major and smaller systems, have
shown the RIW to be a cost effective way to improve equip-
ment reliability. However, the data and experiences also
revealed that the impact of using RIWs has been far greater
than originally anticipated.
RIW use inherently implies that a tremendous amount of
research and coordination has been done on the part of the
contractor and the military. The contractor must understand
what the military wants, and be able to confidently assess
the risks involved, to respond with RIW proposals. The
military must first define what it wants the RIW to achieve:
higher reliability and/or lower life cycle costs. Once this
is done, the impacts on the overall maintenance concept,
manpower, data systems, and administration of the contract
must be determined. Unfortunately, this is the area where
major implementation difficulties have been experienced.
The special attention, documentation and individual
management of RIW equipments, throughout the entire fleet
logistic chain, has never been given consideration in formal
RIW contract proposals and evaluations. The additional
personnel requirements havs not been addressed in a cost/
benefit analysis of RIWs. In additiDn, the cost of lost
opportunity from assets sitting on shelves instead of oper-
ating, has never been calculated, and methods for ensuring




The use of a RIW requires the collection of extensive
data by both the contractor and the Navy to effectively
manage and evaluate the contract. The data requirements
become even more complex because each RIW program is unique.
Component serial number control, oparational hours, removal
and installation dates, and failure cause data, must all be
gathered and analyzed in order to measure the performance of
warranty commitments. We have become conditioned to paying
the contractor for data, bat a growing number of fleet
personnel are concerned enough about relieving the techni-
cian's burdens, that reducing data collection requirements
is now a major movement. RIWs and their requirements have
added to the maintenance data collection problems already
faced by maintenance managers.
Discussions and interviews with Navy personnel involved
in all levels of maintenance management revealed that indi-
viduals must be made aware of what a RIW is, what part they
play in it, and how their actions or decisions impact on
others involved in the program. For the RIW to be effec-
tive, there must be greater effort ta educate those involved
with RIWs, not only at the policy levels, but at the working
levels, also. Without education, RIWs will continue to be a
stumbling block and disruptive program, making aviation
maintenance more difficult than ever.
Naval logistic channels often not only become long, but
very thin. Whereas shore activities can be resupplied by
air, ground, and often sea, the deployed aircraft carrier
does not have a highly flexible and dependable ground
support option. Problems multiply as the ship extends
further from the nearest land base. Ship replenishment
routes are long and typically slow, while the air supply
line becomes less dependable. Island hopping resupply
routes, such as used in the Indian Ocean, stretch the logis-
tics system to its limit. As a result, higher priority for
shipping and handling of RIW assets is required.
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A RIW automatically establishes the logistic support
method during the warranty period. Most RIW applications
are for a two to five year obligation, with a transition to
organic maintenance capability at the termination of the
contract. This concept requires early planning and coordi-
nation to insure that the manpower, support equipment,
spares, training, and technical publications are available.
As more and more of the impacts are addressed, additional
questions arise; the answers indicata that P.IWs are not as
easy to apply and administer as originally thought. The
effects of using a RIM have shown that interested players
should be more involved in the conceptual stage of the
acquistion process to assure a smooth, cost effective, and
reliable introduction into the fleet. The pursuit of a
truly Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) approach is one such
management technique. ILS provides the initial planning,
funding, and controls which will help to assure the fleet
receives not only reliable equipment, but components that
can be expeditiously and aconomically supported throughout
the programmed life cycle.
The principle objective of a RIW is to improve reli-
ability. Reliability testing is conducted to provide an
evaluation of system development progress, as well as the
assurance that specified requirements have been met.
Operational performance, maintainability, and supportability
characteristics are measurad and evaluated during system
test and evaluation. By closely monitoring these character-
istics during the various stages of system evaluation,
improvements in testing can be made. Reliability parameters
should be specified more in terms of operational usage and
demonstration, with the appropriate conditions identified
and simulated as closely as possible. Many times, the reli-
ability required by fleet aircraft and that demonstrated in
the contractor's laboratory ara not synonymous.
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aore emphasis should be placed on building reliability and
maintainability into a system, rather than providing for
improving these characteristics after the sysrem is in
service.
There is a need for the formation of an adequate data
base from which to make intelligent decisions concerning
non-RIW versus RIW support for particular equipments. The
success of this effort will depend on how well the previ-
ously cited difficulties of quality data collection can be
overcome. The accumulation of an accurate data base will
allow for the constant monitoring of RIW contracts.
Evaluating the experience of ongoing warranty programs is
the best basis for developing improved terms, conditions,
and decision processes for future Riff procurements. The
serviced efforts, pursued by the Air Forced Product
Performance Agreement Center and the Navy f s Aviation Supply
Office Technical Division, should be staffed and provided
the resources reguired to evaluate the overall program
results. This more centralized management of RIW evaluation
should be undertaken to enhance and improve the under-
standing and application of the data obtained. Such an
improvement is necessary to properly develop and implement
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